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Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may acquire jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the complaint specifically allege the facts constitutive of unlawful detainer. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, an action for unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.

August 3, 2015, 2:06 am
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1.       In the case of ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANANTAN, herein represented by GILBERT MANANTAN vs. ANICETO SOMERA, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, involving unlawful detainer, as in the instant case, and citing Sec. 1, Rule 70, it was held that “a person deprived of the possession of any land or building xxx  against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied xxx” may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper first-level trial court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

1.1.           The Supreme Court held therein that unlawful detainer is as an action “may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.”

1.2.          The SC stated that in unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was “originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them.”  However, defendant’s possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property “due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand”. 

1.3.          We further wrote from the said ruling:

 “x x x.
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the allegations in the complaint.  To vest the court with the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant from the land in an action for unlawful detainer, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing attributes of unlawful detainer cases, as this proceeding is summary in nature.  The complaint must show on its face enough ground to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.

Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may acquire jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the complaint specifically allege the facts constitutive of unlawful detainer.  The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.  When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, an action for unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.
X x x.
Further, it appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the respondent was already in possession of the disputed portion at the time Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, and it was only after the conduct of a relocation survey, which supposedly showed that respondent was encroaching on the subject property, did Manantan begin asserting her claim of ownership over the portion occupied and used by respondent. 

Clearly, respondent’s possession of the disputed portion was not pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and, resultantly, respondent’s right of possession over the disputed portion is not subject to expiration or termination.  At no point can it be said that respondent’s possession of the disputed portion ceased to be legal and became an unlawful withholding of the property from Manantan.  
Since the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467 failed to satisfy on its face the jurisdictional requirements for an action for unlawful detainer, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the said Complaint and should have dismissed the same.  There is no possible argument around the lack of jurisdiction of MTCC over Civil Case No. 10467.  In Laresma v. Abellana, the Court pronounced:

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced.  Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action.  Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties.  If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu

proprio.  A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory.  Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.

X x x.”
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When may a new fact, supervening event or circumstance justify the modification or non-enforcement of a final and executory judgment?

August 3, 2015, 2:07 am
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    SUPERVENING EVENT. -  In the analogous case of ANANIAS SOCO and FILEMON SOCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CLEMENTE L. SANTIAGO, G.R. No. 116013 October 21, 1996, the issue was: “When may a new fact, supervening event or circumstance justify the modification or non-enforcement of a final and executory judgment?”


In that case, the assailed Decision a quo of decision in MTC Civil Case as affirmed by the RTC had already become final and executory.  The Supreme Court held that indeed in this jurisdiction “the general rule is when a court's judgment or order becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce this judgment”.  It added, though, that “a writ of execution may however be refused on equitable grounds as when there is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or when certain circumstances which transpired after judgment became final, render execution of judgment unjust.” 
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Whether or not the final and executory judgment in the case for quieting of title wherein respondents were adjudged to be the owners of the subject property is a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the final judgment in the previous case for forcible entry

August 3, 2015, 2:08 am
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In the analogous case of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. Heirs of Manuel Abella, represented by MERCEDES N. ABELLA, G.R. No. 143510 November 23, 2005, the sole issue was “whether or not the final and executory judgment in the case for quieting of title wherein respondents were adjudged to be the owners of the subject property is a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the final judgment in the previous case for forcible entry”.

In that case the Petitioner insisted “that the judgment in the quieting of title case should not be considered as a supervening event that bars the enforcement of the decision in the forcible entry case because even if respondents had indeed been finally adjudged to be the absolute owners of the disputed land, an owner of a property is not necessarily entitled to possession thereof, such as when the owner leased out the property to another”.  The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious. It stated:

“X x x.
Hence, there can be no other conclusion but that the finality of the decision in the quieting of title case constitutes a supervening event that justifies the non-enforcement of the judgment in the forcible entry case. In Natalia Xxxty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,11 the Court explained thus:

... The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its judgment terminates when the judgment becomes final. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject to only few exceptions, none of which is present in this case. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment.
. . .

One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.12

In the case at bar, the new circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment in the forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of title had also attained finality and conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the subject land, and the concomitant right of possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the forcible entry case would work injustice on respondents who had been conclusively declared the owners and rightful possessors of the disputed land.

X x x.”
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Whether or not the administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.

August 3, 2015, 2:09 am
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1.      In the analogous case of RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA, LAND AUTHORITY, G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988, the Supreme Court discussed the effect of a PREJUDICIAL QUESTION vis-à-vis a pending ejectment case. 


1.1.           In the said case the sole question was “whether or not the administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.”

1.2.          After defining the general and specific concepts of “prejudicial question” as understood in law, the Supreme Court held that although the two (2) actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, and thus, technically, there was no prejudicial question to speak of, nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the “intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case”.

1.3.          The Supreme Court held therein:

“x x x.
X x x. For while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favor.

Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have every


right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.

X x x.”


1.4.          Thus, the Supreme Court, in the said case, held that faced with these distinct possibilities, “the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case”. It added:

“x x x.
X x x. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed. 2
X x x.”



1.5.          The Supreme Court also stated that “the existence in the said case of the same considerations of identity of parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined” justified the application of the prejudicial question rule in the ejectment case.
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Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission; CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

August 7, 2015, 11:46 pm
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MACARIO CATIPON, JR. VS. JEROME JAPSON, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015.



“x x x.

Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article DC-B, state that –

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

Thus, “the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.”⁠1 

In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel agency of government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC adopted Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which the CA cited as the basis for its pronouncement. Section 4 thereof provides:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.

As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review. And under Section 43, “decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen days from receipt thereof.”⁠2 “Commission Proper” refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central Office.⁠3 

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review, under Section 50 of MC 19, which provides thus:

Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.⁠4 

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA petition premature and thus dismissible.

X x x.”



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Exhaustion of administrative remedies; doctrine of primary jurisdiction

August 7, 2015, 11:53 pm
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MACARIO CATIPON, JR. VS. JEROME JAPSON, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015



“x x x.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that “before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.”⁠5 Indeed, the administrative agency concerned – in this case the Commission Proper – is in the “best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum.”⁠6 

The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review, as “[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.”⁠7 When petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure prescribed in MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it.

X x x.”



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Where defenses of good faith, lack of intent, and ignorance of law not appreciated in administrative case

August 8, 2015, 12:02 am
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MACARIO CATIPON, JR. VS. JEROME JAPSON, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015

“x x x.

We likewise affirm the CA’s pronouncement that petitioner was negligent in filling up his CSPE application form and in failing to verify beforehand the specific requirements for the CSPE examination. Petitioner’s claim of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.⁠8  Moreover, petitioner – as mere applicant for acceptance into the professional service through the CSPE – cannot expect to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is required for the examination falls on him, and not the CSC or his colleagues in office. As aptly ruled by the appellate court:

In Bacaya⁠9  v. Ramos, the Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of both negligence and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he issued an arrest warrant despite the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed on an accused in a particular criminal case. Respondent judge in the said case claimed that the issuance of the warrant was a mistake, done in good faith and that it has been a practice in his office for the Clerk of Court to study motions and that he would simply sign the prepared order. The Supreme Court rejected his defense and stated that negligence is the failure to observe such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under ordinary circumstances. An act of the will is necessary&r deliberate intent to exist; such is not necessary in an act of negligence.

Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his application to take the CSPE exam. He simply relied on his prior knowledge of the rules, particularly, that he could substitute his deficiency in Military Science with the length of his government service. He cannot lay blame on the personnel head of the SSS-Bangued, Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent rules contained in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were truly a reasonably prudent and careful person, petitioner himself should have verified from the CSC the requirements imposed on prospective examinees. In so doing, he would certainly have been informed of the new CSC policy disallowing substitution of one’s length of government service for academic deficiencies. Neither should petitioner have relied on an unnamed Civil Service employee’s advice since it was not shown that the latter was authorized to give information regarding the examination nor that said employee was competent and capable of giving correct information. His failure to verify the actual CSPE requirements which a reasonably prudent and careful person would have done constitutes negligence. Though his failure was not a deliberate act of the will, such is not necessary in an act of negligence and, as in Bacaya, negligence is not inconsistent with a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.⁠10 

The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service may be imposed upon an erring public officer as long as the questioned act or conduct taints the image and integrity of the office; and the act need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official functions. Under our civil service laws, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions have been treated as such: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safekeep public records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judge’s act of brandishing a gun, and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; a court interpreter’s participation in the execution of a document conveying complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in the latter’s family; selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during office hours; a CA employee’s forging of receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations; a Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) employee’s act of repeatedly changing his IP address, which caused network problems within his office and allowed him to gain access to the entire GSIS network, thus putting the system in a vulnerable state of security;⁠11  a public prosecutor’s act of signing a motion to dismiss that was not prepared by him, but by a judge;⁠12  and a teacher’s act of directly selling a book to her students in violation of the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers.⁠13  In petitioner’s case, his act of making false entries in his CSPE application undoubtedly constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; the absence of a willful or deliberate intent to falsify or make dishonest entries in his application is immaterial, for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service “may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules.”⁠14 

Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner’s plea that “in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility,” his career service professional eligibility should not be revoked. The act of using a fake or spurious civil service eligibility for one’s benefit not only amounts to violation of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results in prejudice to the government and the public in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no place in the public service.⁠15  “Assumption of public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires the highest standards of ethical conduct. A person aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.”⁠16 

X x x.”


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As a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable or when it appears that the controversy has ever been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.

August 8, 2015, 12:26 am
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MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS AND ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO VS. FORTUNATO CAJUCOM, G.R. No. 171095, June 22, 2015.

The Issues:

Whether or not the writ of execution should be quashed.

The Ruling:

The Court is now confronted with the singular issue of whether grounds exist to quash the subject writ of execution.

It is a consistent practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a writ of execution is issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order restraining its issuance.⁠1  In addition, even a writ of demolition, if the case calls for it, is ancillary to the process of execution and is logically also issued as a consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.⁠2

Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter of right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (la)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.⁠3

Stated differently, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution.⁠4 Its issuance is, in fact, the trial court’s ministerial duty, the only limitation being that the writ must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, more particularly, the orders or decrees in the dispositive portion of the decision.⁠5  Even the holding in abeyance of the issuance of a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment can be considered abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.⁠6 

In sum, this Court has explained the principle as follows:
It is not disputed that the judgment sought to be executed in the case at bar had already become final and executory. It is fundamental that the prevailing party in a litigation may, at any time within five (5) years after the entry thereof, have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement and the court not only has the power and authority to order its execution but it is its ministerial duty to do so. It has also been held that the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable or when it appears that the controversy has ever been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.Defendant-appellant has not shown that she falls in any of the situations afore-mentioned. Ordinarily, an order of execution of a final judgment is not appealable. Otherwise, as was said by this Court in Molina v. De la Riva, a case could never end. Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter related to the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. The nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally ministerial.⁠7 

And equally settled is the rule that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.⁠8  It may no longer be modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors or to make mine pro tune entries, or when it is a void judgment.⁠9  Outside of these exceptions, the court which rendered judgment only has the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution.⁠10  A decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous.⁠11 Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.⁠12  Thus, an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.⁠13 

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the trial court’s decision had become final and executory, as petitioners themselves did not appeal the same. In the current petition, neither is there an allegation that the judgment is a void one. But even if there is such an allegation, the issue is a settled one, as this Court itself, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioner’s co-obligors, i.e., Punoet al., had upheld the judgment rather than declare the same void. That petition also alleged lack of jurisdiction and raised other issues which are similarly raised in the instant petition.

Therefore, at this late stage, nothing more may be done to disturb the said final judgment.

As for the regularity of the issuance of the writ of execution itself, it is uncontested that all the requirements for the issuance of such a writ, as laid down in the rules, were followed in the case a bar. No issue was raised before the trial court which qualifies as an exception to the general rule that parties may not object to its issuance. Instead, for the most part, the petition appears to pray for a quashal of the writ of execution on grounds that, when closely examined, go into the merits of the case and the judgment being executed and are not based on any defect in the writ of execution itself or in its issuance.

To illustrate, petitioners cite the following as grounds for the quashal of the writ of execution: (1) that it allegedly would compel the municipal engineer to exercise the powers and duties of the mayor; (2) that it forces the mayor to perform a discretionary duty; (3) that there was no exhaustion of administrative remedies; and, (4) that the judgment obligee had no well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of mandamus.

Such grounds, however, go into the substance and merits of the case which had been decided with finality, and have no bearing on the validity of the issuance of the writ of execution. They raise issues which have been properly joined and addressed by the trial court in its decision. But at this late stage of execution, tackling those matters is a re-litigation of those issues, which no court can perform without offending well-settled principles. Essentially, arguments as to these issues are proper for an appeal, a remedy which none of the petitioners and the other judgment-obligors have taken. Instead, petitioners’ co-defendants in the case, the other judgment-obligors Puno, et al., filed a petition to annul the judgment, also raising the trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction and the same arguments as aforementioned, but such petition was denied by the CA, which denial was affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court. Hence, to this Court, the final judgment has become the law of the case which is now immovable. The rudiments of fair play, justice, and due process require that parties cannot raise for the first time on appeal from a denial of a motion to quash a writ of execution issues which they could have raised but never did during the trial and even on appeal from the decision of the trial court.⁠14 

The simple matter is that petitioners herein may not do indirectly, by assailing the writ of execution, what they cannot do directly, which is attacking the final, immutable and unalterable judgment of the RTC. They may not raise in their opposition to the writ of execution issues that they should have raised in the case during the trial proper or against the judgment via an appeal. They may not object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except under the following circumstances:

(1)
the writ of execution varies the judgment;
(2)
there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
(3)
execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
(4)
it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;
(5)
the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or
(6)
it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.⁠15 


For the most part, the petition does not clearly state whether the subject writ of execution falls under any of the above exceptions. It raised two grounds, i.e., that the writ is incapable of being enforced and that it varies the judgment, which can be interpreted as falling under the exceptions above, but these grounds as applied to the case at bar simply lack merit.


X x x.”
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A judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but extends to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.⁠

August 8, 2015, 12:34 am
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MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS AND ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO VS. FORTUNATO CAJUCOM, G.R. No. 171095, June 22, 2015.

“x x x.

But even if the decision was entirely silent on the matter, this Court has held that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but extends to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.⁠30 In the case at bar, the dispositive part of the trial court’s decision did not specify which of the alternative duties the public officers were to perform, but since the decision itself factually states that the plaintiff sues for the removal of the subject structures, and that the structures are built on a public highway, then it follows that only one of the alternative duties – that of demolition – is capable of enforcement. As demolition stands as the only and necessary way to effectuate the judgment, then it is what the execution of the judgment should consist of. The writ of execution and a companion writ of demolition, if later prayed for and issued by the trial court, are just a natural consequence of and a necessary means to enforce the said decision.⁠31 

X x x.”


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Inherent illegality of structures built on public areas.

August 8, 2015, 12:39 am
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MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS AND ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO VS. FORTUNATO CAJUCOM, G.R. No. 171095, June 22, 2015.

“x x x.

Flowing from this, however, is the reality that two of the three obligations, those which would “require owners of illegally constructed structures to obtain the necessary permit” and “make necessary changes in the construction of said structures” are simply not enforceable due to the inherent illegality of the structures concerned which were all built on public areas. No amount of permits nor change in construction would legitimize the illegal structures as they are built on property for public use, which is the public highway. Such is a factual finding that is binding on this Court. The court below found that the areas occupied are the shoulder and drainages which are part of the road’s right-of-way and which, in turn, is considered part of the highway under Presidential Decree No. 17, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Philippine Highway Act of 1972.⁠23 Punoet al. will never legally acquire the same by prescription, for prescription does not run against the State or its subdivisions on any of its non-patrimonial property.⁠24 The provincial road whose shoulder was occupied by these defendants is one such non-patrimonial property.⁠25  And as far as the structures obstruct free passage to the road, they likewise will never attain legality by mere lapse of time.⁠26 
X x x.”



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Questioned handwritings, signatures, and documents; how examined; proof of genuiness

August 8, 2015, 12:48 am
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JANET CARBONELL VS. JULITA A. CARBONELL-MENDES, REPRESENTED BY HER BROTHER AND ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, VIRGILIO A. CARBONELL, G.R. No. 205681, July 01, 2015.

“x x x.

Besides, the Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the finding of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the signature of respondent was forged on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 April 1997, which was clearly established by the evidence presented during the trial. Under Section 22,⁠6  Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, among the methods of proving the genuineness of the handwriting are through a witness familiar with such handwriting or a comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and the admitted genuine specimens of the handwriting. In this case, respondent, the purported writer or signatory to the Deed of Absolute Sale, testified that her signature was forged. To prove the forgery, respondent presented, among others, her Canadian and Philippine passports, driver’s license, citizenship card, and health card, showing her genuine signature which was clearly different from the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale.⁠7  Comparing the genuine signature of respondent on these documents with her purported signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale, the RTC found “significant differences in terms of handwriting strokes, as well as the shapes and sizes of letters, fairly suggesting that the plaintiff [Julita A. Carbonell-Mendes] was not the author of the questioned signature.”⁠8  Signatures on a questioned document may be examined by the trial court judge and compared with the admitted genuine signatures to determine the issue of authenticity of the contested document. As held in Spouses Estacio v. Dr. Jaranilla:⁠9

It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without necessarily resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.”⁠10 

X x x.”




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A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law; EXCEPTIONS.

August 8, 2015, 12:56 am
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JANET CARBONELL VS. JULITA A. CARBONELL-MENDES, REPRESENTED BY HER BROTHER AND ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, VIRGILIO A. CARBONELL, G.R. No. 205681, July 01, 2015.


"x x x,

Petitioner in this case is raising a question of fact: whether the signature of respondent was forged on the Deed of Absolute Sale, which would invalidate TCT No. T-51120 issued in the name of Spouses Carbonell. The issue raised by petitioner is clearly a question of fact which requires a review of the evidence presented. This Court is not a trier of facts,⁠1 and it is not its function to examine, review, or evaluate the evidence all over again.⁠2

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law, thus:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.⁠3 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court is generally limited to reviewing only errors of law. Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule, such as when:

(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that,  if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.⁠4 

Petitioner failed to show that this case falls under any of the exceptions. The finding of forgery by the RTC was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are deemed binding and conclusive.⁠5 

X x x.”



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PHILIPPINE COMPETITION ACT: BASIC FEATURES.

August 8, 2015, 4:32 am
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PHILIPPINE COMPETITION ACT:
BASIC FEATURES.

By:

Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Partner, Laserna Cueva-Mercader Law Offices


OVERVIEW.

After more than 28 years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, at last, the Philippines now has its own version of the U.S. Anti-Trust Law.

I refer to the newly approved R.A. No. Republic Act No. 10667, also known as the “Philippine Competition Act”.

POLICIES.

The goals of the Philippine Competition Act are as follows:

“x x x.

(a) Enhance economic efficiency and promote free and fair competition in trade, industry and all commercial economic activities, as well as establish a National Competition Policy to be implemented by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and all of its political agencies as a whole;

(b) Prevent economic concentration which will control the production, distribution, trade, or industry that will unduly stifle competition, lessen, manipulate or constrict the discipline of free markets; and

(c) Penalize all forms of anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, with the objective of protecting consumer welfare and advancing domestic and international trade and economic development.

X x x.” (Sec. 2, R.A. 10667).

ENTITIES AND ACTIVITIES COVERED.

The law is enforceable against “any person or entity engaged in any trade, industry and commerce in the Republic of the Philippines”.

It is likewise be applicable to “international trade having direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects in trade, industry, or commerce in the Republic of the Philippines, including those that result from acts done outside the Republic of the Philippines”. (Sec. 3, Id.).

EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE.

The law does not apply to “the combinations or activities of workers or employees nor to agreements or arrangements with their employers when such combinations, activities, agreements, or arrangements are designed solely to facilitate collective bargaining in respect of conditions of employment”.

PHILIPPINE COMPETITION COMMISSION.

The law creates a Philippine Competition Commission (“PCC” or the “Commission”) that shall “implement the national competition policy and attain the objectives and purposes of this Act”.

The Commission is “an attached agency to the Office of the President”. (Sec. 5, Id.).

The Chairperson and the Commissioners  thereof have the “rank equivalent of cabinet secretary and undersecretary, respectively”.

They are “appointed by the President”. (Sec. 6, Id.).

They have a term of office of “seven (7) years without reappointment”. (Sec. 7, Id.).

They “enjoy security of tenure and shall not be suspended or removed from office except for just cause as provided by law”. (Id.).

POWERS; FUNCTIONS; JURISDICTION.

Sec. 12 of R.A. 10667 enumerates the jurisdiction, powers and functions of the Commission.

The Commission had “original and primary jurisdiction over the enforcement and implementation of the provisions of this Act, and its implementing rules and regulations”.  (Sec. 12, Id.).

Under Sec. 12 of RA 10667, the Commission shall exercise the following powers and functions:

“x x x.

(a) Conduct inquiry, investigate, and hear and decide on cases involving any violation of this Act and other existing competition laws motu proprio or upon receipt of a verified complaint from an interested party or upon referral by the concerned regulatory agency, and institute the appropriate civil or criminal proceedings;

(b) Review proposed mergers and acquisitions, determine thresholds for notification, determine the requirements and procedures for notification, and upon exercise of its powers to review, prohibit mergers and acquisitions that will substantially prevent, restrict, or lessen competition in the relevant market;

(c) Monitor and undertake consultation with stakeholders and affected agencies for the purpose of understanding market behavior;

(d) Upon finding, based on substantial evidence, that an entity has entered into an anti-competitive agreement or has abused its dominant position after due notice and hearing, stop or redress the same, by applying remedies, such as, but not limited to, issuance of injunctions, requirement of divestment, and disgorgement of excess profits under such reasonable parameters that shall be prescribed by the rules and regulations implementing this Act;

(e) Conduct administrative proceedings, impose sanctions, fines or penalties for any noncompliance with or breach of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) and punish for contempt;

(f) Issue subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum to require the production of books, records, or other documents or data which relate to any matter relevant to the investigation and personal appearance before the Commission, summon witnesses, administer oaths, and issue interim orders such as show cause orders and cease and desist orders after due notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing this Act;

(g) Upon order of the court, undertake inspections of business premises and other offices, land and vehicles, as used by the entity, where it reasonably suspects that relevant books, tax records, or other documents which relate to any matter relevant to the investigation are kept, in order to prevent the removal, concealment, tampering with, or destruction of the books, records, or other documents;

(h) Issue adjustment or divestiture orders including orders for corporate reorganization or divestment in the manner and under such terms and conditions as may be prescribed in the rules and regulations implementing this Act. Adjustment or divestiture orders, which are structural remedies, should only be imposed:

(1) Where there is no equally effective behavioral remedy; or

(2) Where any equally effective behavioral remedy would be more burdensome for the enterprise concerned than the structural remedy.

Changes to the structure of an enterprise as it existed before the infringement was committed would only be proportionate to the substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement that derives from the very structure of the enterprise;

(i) Deputize any and all enforcement agencies of the government or enlist the aid and support of any private institution, corporation, entity or association, in the implementation of its powers and functions;

(j) Monitor compliance by the person or entities concerned with the cease and desist order or consent judgment;

(k) Issue advisory opinions and guidelines on competition matters for the effective enforcement of this Act and submit annual and special reports to Congress, including proposed legislation for the regulation of commerce, trade, or industry;

(l) Monitor and analyze the practice of competition in markets that affect the Philippine economy; implement and oversee measures to promote transparency and accountability; and ensure that prohibitions and requirements of competition laws are adhered to;

(m) Conduct, publish, and disseminate studies and reports on anti-competitive conduct and agreements to inform and guide the industry and consumers;

(n) Intervene or participate in administrative and regulatory proceedings requiring consideration of the provisions of this Act that are initiated by government agencies such as theSecurities and Exchange Commission, the Energy Regulatory Commission and the National Telecommunications Commission;

(o) Assist the National Economic and Development Authority, in consultation with relevant agencies and sectors, in the preparation and formulation of a national competition policy;

(p) Act as the official representative of the Philippine government in international competition matters;

(q) Promote capacity building and the sharing of best practices with other competition-related bodies;

(r) Advocate pro-competitive policies of the government by:

(1) Reviewing economic and administrative regulations, motu proprio or upon request, as to whether or not they adversely affect relevant market competition, and advising the concerned agencies against such regulations; and

(2) Advising the Executive Branch on the competitive implications of government actions, policies and programs; and

(s) Charging reasonable fees to defray the administrative cost of the services rendered.

X x x.”

ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

The Office for Competition (OFC) under the Department of Justice (DOJ-OFC) “shall only conduct preliminary investigation and undertake prosecution of all criminal offenses arising under this Act and other competition-related laws in accordance with Section 31 of Chapter VI of this Act.” (Sec. 13, R.A. 10667).

Sec. 31 of R.A. 10667, inter alia, provides that “if the evidence so warrants, the Commission may file before the DOJ criminal complaints for violations of this Act or relevant laws for preliminary investigation and prosecution before the proper court”.

The DOJ shall conduct such preliminary investigation “in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure”.

The same provision states that “except as provided in Section 12(i) of Chapter II of this Act, no law enforcement agency shall conduct any kind of fact-finding, inquiry or investigation into any competition-related matters”. (Sec. 31, R.A. 10667).

PROHIBITED ACTS

Sec. 14 of R.A. 10667 define and enumerates the “anti-competitive agreements”.  
The following agreements, between or among competitors, are per se prohibited:

“(1) Restricting competition as to price, or components thereof, or other terms of trade;

(2) Fixing priceat an auction or in any form of bidding including cover bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation and market allocation and other analogous practices of bid manipulation. (Sec. 14 [a], R.A. 10667).

Sec. 14 (b) of R.A. 10667 provides that the following agreements, between or among competitors which have the object or effect of substantially preventing, restricting or lessening competition are prohibited:

“x x x.

(1) Setting, Kiting, or controlling production, markets, technical development, or investment;

(2) Dividing or sharing the market, whether by volume of sales or purchases, territory, type of goods or services, buyers or sellers or any other means.”

X x x.”

Sec. 14 (c) of R.A. 10667 provides that “agreements other than those specified in (a) and (b) of this section which have the object or effect of substantially preventing, restricting or lessening competition shall also be prohibited”.

It clarifies, though that, “those which contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods and services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits, may not necessarily be deemed a violation of this Act”.

The following are not deemed “competitors” for purposes of Sec. 14 of R.A. 10667:

“An entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another entity or entities, have common economic interests, and are not otherwise able to decide or act independently of each other, shall not be considered competitors for purposes of this section. (Last paragraph,Sec. 14, R.A. 10667).

ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION.

Sec. 15 of R.A. 10667provides that “it shall be prohibited for one or more entities to abuse their dominant position by engaging in conduct that would substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition”.  These are the following:

“x x x.

(a) Selling goods or services below cost with the object of driving competition out of the relevant market: Provided, That in the Commission’s evaluation of this fact, it shall consider whether the entity or entities have no such object and the price established was in good faith to meet or compete with the lower price of a competitor in the same market selling the same or comparable product or service of like quality;

(b) Imposing barriers to entry or committing acts that prevent competitors from growing within the market in an anti-competitive manner except those that develop in the market as a result of or arising from a superior product or process, business acumen, or legal rights or laws;

(c) Making a transaction subject to acceptance by the other parties of other obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the transaction;

(d) Setting prices or other terms or conditions that discriminate unreasonably between customers or sellersof the same goods or services, where such customers or sellers are contemporaneously trading on similar terms and conditions, where the effect may be to lessen competition substantially: Provided, That the following shall be considered permissible price differentials:

(1) Socialized pricing for the less fortunate sector of the economy;
(2) Price differential which reasonably or approximately reflect differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from differing methods, technical conditions, or quantities in which the goods or services are sold or delivered to the buyers or sellers;
(3) Price differential or terms of sale offered in response to the competitive price of payments, services or changes in the facilities furnished by a competitor; and

(4) Price changes in response to changing market conditions, marketability of goods or services, or volume;

(e) Imposing restrictions on the lease or contract for sale or trade of goods or servicesconcerning where, to whom, or in what forms goods or services may be sold or traded, such as fixing prices, giving preferential discounts or rebate upon such price, or imposing conditions not to deal with competing entities, where the object or effect of the restrictions is to prevent, restrict or lessen competition substantially: Provided, That nothing contained in this Act shall prohibit or render unlawful:

(1) Permissible franchising, licensing, exclusive merchandising or exclusive distributorship agreementssuch as those which give each party the right to unilaterally terminate the agreement; or

(2) Agreements protecting intellectual property rights, confidential information, or trade secrets;

(f) Making supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the purchase of other goods or services from the supplier which have no direct connection with the main goods or services to be supplied;

(g) Directly or indirectly imposing unfairly low purchase prices for the goods or services of, among others, marginalized agricultural producers, fisherfolk, micro-, small-, medium-scale enterprises, and other marginalized service providers and producers;

(h) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling price on their competitors, customers, suppliers or consumers, providedthat prices that develop in the market as a result of or due to a superior product or process, business acumen or legal rights or laws shall not be considered unfair prices; and

(i) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers, provided that limitations that develop in the market as a result of or due to a superior product or process, business acumen or legal rights or laws shall not be a violation of this Act x x x.

X x x.”

Sec. 15 of R.A. 10667 provides that “nothing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted as a prohibition on having a dominant position in a relevant market or on acquiring, maintaining and increasing market share through legitimate means that do not substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition”.

 The same provision states that “any conduct which contributes to improving production or distribution of goods or services within the relevant market, or promoting technical and economic progresswhile allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit may not necessarily be considered an abuse of dominant position”. (Sec. 15, R.A. 10667).

The same provision states that the foregoing paragraphs “shall not constrain the Commission or the relevant regulator from pursuing measures that would promote fair competition or more competition as provided in this Act”. (Id.).


MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATION.

1.      REVIEW POWERS. - Under Sec. 16 of R.A. 10667, the Commission has the “power to review mergers and acquisitions based on factors deemed relevant by the Commission”.

2.    PROHIBITED ACT. - Parties to a merger or acquisition agreement wherein the value of the transaction exceeds one billion pesos (P1,000,000,000.00) are “prohibited from consummating their agreement until thirty (30) days after providing notification to the Commission in the form and containing the information specified in the regulations issued by the Commission”. (Sec. 17, R.A. 10667).

The Commission shall promulgate “other criteria, such as increased market share in the relevant market in excess of minimum thresholds, that may be applied specifically to a sector, or across some or all sectors”, in determining whether parties to a merger or acquisition shall notify the Commission under this Chapter. (Id.).

3.    VOID AGREEMENT. - An agreement consummated in violation of the requirement to notify the Commission shall be “considered void and subject the parties to an administrative fine of one percent (1%) to five percent (5%) of the value of the transaction.” (Id.).

4.    WHEN AGREEMENT IS DEEMED APPROVED. - When the periods set by R.A. 10667 to resolve the notice of merger or consolidation have expired and no decision has been promulgated by the Commission for whatever reason, “the merger or acquisition shall be deemed approved and the parties may proceed to implement or consummate it.”  (Id.).

5.     CONFIDENTIALITY RULE. - All notices, documents and information provided to or emanating from the Commission under this section are “subject to confidentiality rule under Section 34 of this Act except when the release of information contained therein is with the consent of the notifying entity or is mandatorily required to be disclosed by law or by a valid order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or of a government or regulatory agency, including an exchange.”  (Id.).

6.    BANKS AND SIMILAR FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS; EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; SPECIAL CORPORATIONS. - In the case of the merger or acquisition of “banks, banking institutions, building and loan associations, trust companies, insurance companies, public utilities, educational institutions and other special corporations governed by special laws”, a favorable or no-objection ruling by the Commission shall “not be construed as dispensing of the requirement for a favorable recommendation by the appropriate government agency under Section 79 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines”. (Id.).

A favorable recommendation by a governmental agency with a competition mandate shall give rise to a disputable presumption that the proposed merger or acquisition is not violative of this Act.

7.     EFFECT OF NOTIFICATION. – Under Sec. 18 of R.A. 10667, if within the relevant periods stipulated in Sec. 17 thereof the Commission determines that the merger or consolidation agreement is prohibitedunder Section 20 and does not qualify for exemption under Section 21 of this Chapter, the Commission may:

“x x x.

(a) Prohibit the implementation of the agreement;

(b) Prohibit the implementation of the agreement unless and until it is modified by changes specified by the Commission.

(c) Prohibit the implementation of the agreement unless and until the pertinent party or parties enter into legally enforceable agreements specified by the Commission.

X x x.”

Sec. 19 of R.A. 10667 grants the Commission the power shall, from time to time, adopt and publish regulations stipulating:

“x x x.

(a) The transaction value threshold and such other criteria subject to the notification requirement of Section 17 of this Act;

(b) The information that must be supplied for notified merger or acquisition;

(c) Exceptions or exemptions from the notification requirement; and

(d) Other rules relating to the notification procedures.

X x x.”

8.    PROHIBITED MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS.– Sec. 20, R.A. 10667 prohibits merger or acquisition agreements that “substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition in the relevant market or in the market for goods or services as may be determined by the Commission shall be prohibited”.

9.    EXEMPTIONS. – Sec. 21 of R.A. 10667  provides that the following merger or consolidations agreements prohibited under Sec. 20 of the Act may nonetheless be exempt are exempted from from prohibition by the Commission when the parties establish either of the following:

“x x x.

(a) The concentration has brought about or is likely to bring about gains in efficienciesthat are greater than the effects of any limitation on competition that result or likely to result from the merger or acquisition agreement; or

(b) A party to the merger or acquisition agreement is faced with actual or imminent financial failure, and the agreement represents the least anti-competitive arrangement among the known alternative uses for the failing entity’s assets:

Provided, That an entity shall not be prohibited from continuing to own and hold the stock or other share capital or assets of another corporation which it acquired prior to the approval of this Actoracquiring or maintaining its market share in a relevant market through such means without violating the provisions of this Act:

Provided, further, That the acquisition of the stock or other share capital of one or more corporations solely for investment and not used for voting or exercising control and not to otherwise bring about, or attempt to bring about the prevention, restriction, or lessening of competition in the relevant market shall not be prohibited.

X x x.”

CONTROL OF AN ENTITY. – Sec, 25 of R.A. 10667 provides that in determining the control of an entity, the Commission may consider the following:

“x x x.

Control is presumed to exist when the parent owns directly or indirectly, through subsidiaries, more than one half (1/2) of the voting power of an entity, unless in exceptional circumstances, it can clearly be demonstrated that such ownership does not constitute control. Control also exists even when an entity owns one half (1/2) or less of the voting power of another entity when:

(a) There is power over more than one half (1/2) of the voting rights by virtue of an agreement with investors;

(b) There is power to direct or govern the financial and operating policies of the entity under a statute or agreement;

(c) There is power to appoint or remove the majority of the members of the board of directors or equivalent governing body;

(d) There is power to cast the majority votes at meetings of the board of directors or equivalent governing body;

(e) There exists ownership over or the right to use all or a significant part of the assets of the entity;

(f) There exist rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the decisions of the entity.

X x x.”

ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENT OR CONDUCT; HOW DETERMINED.– Sec. 26 of R.A. 10667  provides that in determining whether anti-competitiveagreement or conduct has been committed, the Commission shall:

“x x x.

(a) Define the relevant market allegedly affected by the anti-competitive agreement or conduct, following the principles laid out in Section 24 of this Chapter;

(b) Determine if there is actual or potential adverse impact on competition in the relevant market caused by the alleged agreement or conduct, and if such impact is substantial and outweighs the actual or potential efficiency gains that result from the agreement or conduct;

(c) Adopt a broad and forward-looking perspective, recognizing future market developments, any overriding need to make the goods or services available to consumers, the requirements of large investments in infrastructure, the requirements of law, and the need of our economy to respond to international competition, but also taking account of past behavior of the parties involved and prevailing market conditions;

(d) Balance the need to ensure that competition is not prevented or substantially restricted and the risk that competition efficiency, productivity, innovation, or development of priority areas or industries in the general interest of the country may be deterred by overzealous or undue intervention; and

(e) Assess the totality of evidence on whether it is more likely than not that the entity has engaged in anti-competitive agreement or conduct including whether the entity’s conduct was done with a reasonable commercial purpose such as but not limited to phasing out of a product or closure of a business, or as a reasonable commercial response to the market entry or conduct of a competitor.

X x x.”

MARKET DOMINANT POSITION. – Sec. 27 of R.A. 10667 provides that in determining whether an entity has market dominant position for purposes of this Act, the Commission shall consider the following:

“x x x.

(a) The share of the entity in the relevant market and whether it is able to fix prices unilaterally or to restrict supply in the relevant market;

(b) The existence of barriers to entry and the elements which could foreseeably alter both said barriers and the supply from competitors;

(c) The existence and power of its competitors;

(d) The possibility of access by its competitors or other entities to its sources of inputs;

(e) The power of its customers to switch to other goods or services;

(f) Its recent conducts; and

(g) Other criteria established by the regulations of this Act.

X x x.”

There is a rebuttable presumption of market dominant position “if the market share of an entity in the relevant market is at least fifty percent (50%), unless a new market share threshold is determined by the Commission for that particular sector.” (Sec. 27, R.A. 10667).

The acquiring, maintaining and increasing of market share “through legitimate means not substantially preventing, restricting, or lessening competition in the market such as but not limited to having superior skills, rendering superior service, producing or distributing quality products, having business acumen, and the enjoyment and use of protected intellectual property rights” are not violative of the Act. (Id.).

FORBEARANCE. – Sec. 28 of R.A. 10667 provides that the Commission “may forbear from applying the provisions of this Act, for a limited time, in whole or in part, in all or specific cases, on an entity or group of entities”, if in its determination:

“x x x.

(a) Enforcement is not necessary to the attainment of the policy objectives of this Act;

(b) Forbearance will neither impede competition in the market where the entity or group of entities seeking exemption operates nor in related markets; and

(c) Forbearance is consistent with public interest and the benefit and welfare of the consumers.

X x x.”

A “public hearing” is needed to assist the Commission in making this determination. (Sec. 28, R.A. 10667).

The Commission’s order exempting the relevant entity or group of entities under this section is always “made public”.

Conditions may be attached to the forbearance if the Commission deems it appropriate to ensure the long-term interest of consumers. (Id.).

ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES. - Sec. 29 of  R.A. 10667 provides for the Administrative Penalties under the Act:

“x x x.

(a) Administrative Fines. – In any investigation under Chapter III, Sections 14 and 15, and Chapter IV, Sections 17 and 20 of this Act, after due notice and hearing, the Commission may impose the following schedule of administrative fines on any entity found to have violated the said sections:

First offense: Fine of up to one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00);

Second offense: Fine of not less than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) but not more than two hundred fifty million pesos (P250,000,000.00).

In fixing the amount of the fine, the Commission shall have regard to both the gravity and the duration of the violation.

(b) Failure to Comply With an Order of the Commission. – An entity which fails or refuses to comply with a ruling, order or decision issued by the Commission shall pay a penalty of not less than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) up to two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) for each violation and a similar amount of penalty for each day thereafter until the said entity fully complies. Provided that these fines shall only accrue daily beginning forty-five (45) days from the time that the said decision, order or ruling was received.

(c) Supply of Incorrect or Misleading Information. – The Commission may likewise impose upon any entity fines of up to one million pesos (PI,000,000.00) where, intentionally or negligently, they supply incorrect or misleading information in any document, application or other paper filed with or submitted to the Commission or supply incorrect or misleading information in an application for a binding ruling, a proposal for a consent judgment, proceedings relating to a show cause order, or application for modification of the Commission’s ruling, order or approval, as the case may be.

(d) Any other violations not specifically penalized under the relevant provisions of this Act shall be penalized by a fine of not less than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) up to two million pesos (P2,000,000.00).

Provided that the schedule of fines indicated in this section shall be increased by the Commission every five (5) years to maintain their real value from the time it was set.

X x x.”

CRIMINAL PENALTIES. – Sec. 30 of R.A. 10667 provides that an entity that enters into any anti-competitive agreement as covered by Section 14(a) and 14(b) of the Act “shall, for each and every violation, be penalized by imprisonment from two (2) to seven (7) years, and a fine of not less than fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) but not more than two hundred fifty million pesos (P250,000,000.00)”. The penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the “responsible officers, and directors of the entity.” (Id.).

When the entities involved are juridical persons, the penalty of. imprisonment shall be imposed on its officers, directors, or employees holding managerial positions, who are knowingly and willfully responsible for such violation.

POWER OF COMMISSION TO CONDUCT FACT-FINDING OR PRELIMINARY INQUIRY. – Sec. 31 of R.A. 10667 provides that the Commission, motu proprio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint by an interested party or upon referral by a regulatory agency, shall have “the sole and exclusive authority to initiate and conduct a fact-finding or preliminary inquiryfor the enforcement of this Act based on reasonable grounds”.

After considering the statements made, or documents or articles produced in the course of the fact-finding or preliminary inquiry, the Commission shall terminate the same by:

“x x x.

(a) Issuing a resolution ordering its closure if no violation or infringement of this Act is found; or

(b) Issuing a resolution to proceed, on the basis of reasonable grounds, to the conduct of a full administrative investigation.

X x x.”

1.      CEASE AND DESIST ORDER. – The same provision states that the Commission, “ after due notice and hearing, and on the basis of facts and evidence presented, may issue an order for the temporary cessation or desistance” from the performance of certain acts by the respondent entity, the continued performance of which would result in a material and adverse effect on consumers or competition in the relevant market. (Sec. 31, R.A. 10667).

2.    CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. – Sec. 31 of R.A. 10667 also provides that it the evidence so warrants, the Commission “may file before the DOJ criminal complaints for violations of this Act or relevant laws for preliminary investigation and prosecution before the proper court”. The DOJ shall conduct such “preliminary investigation” in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

3.    EXCLUSIVE POWER OF THE COMMISSION. – Sec. 31 of R.A. 10667 further provides that except as provided in Section 12(i) of the Act, “no law enforcement agency shall conduct any kind of fact-finding, inquiry or investigation into any competition-related matters.”


ORIGINAL AND PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION. - Sec. 32 of R.A. 10667 provides that the Commission shall have “original and primary jurisdiction in the enforcement and regulation of all competition-related issues”.

1.      ISSUES COVERED. - The Commission has jurisdiction even if the issue involves “both competition and noncompetition issues”, but the concerned sector regulator shall be “consulted and afforded reasonable opportunity to submit its own opinion and recommendation on the matter before the Commission makes a decision on any case”. (Sec. 32, R.A. 10667).

2.    COORDINATION WITH SECTOR REGULATORS. - Where appropriate, the Commission and the sector regulators shall work together “to issue rules and regulations” to promote competition, protect consumers, and prevent abuse of market power by dominant players within their respective sectors. (Id.).

SUBPOENA; CONTEMPT POWER; POWER TO IMMPOSE FINES. - Sec. 33 of R.A. 10667 provides that the Commission has the powers to administer oaths, issue subpoena duces tecum,  summon witnesses, commission consultants or experts, enforce its orders, carry out its resolutions, punish for contempt, and impose fines.

CONFIDENTIALITY RULE. - Sec. 34 of R.A. 10667 provides that confidential business information submitted by entities, relevant to “any inquiry or investigation” being conducted pursuant to the Act as well as “any deliberation” in relation thereto, “shall not, in any manner, be directly or indirectly disclosed, published, transferred, copied, or disseminated”.

1.      EXCEPTION. - The confidentiality rule shall not apply if the notifying entity “consents to the disclosure, or the document or information is mandatorily required to be disclosed by law or by a valid order of a court of competent jurisdiction or of a government or regulatory agency, including an exchange”. (Sec. 34, R.A. 10667).

2.    SOURCES OF INFORMATION; WHISTLE BLOWERS. - The identity of the persons who provide information to the Commission under condition of anonymity, shall remain confidential, “unless such confidentiality is expressly waived by these persons.” (Id.).

3.    FINE FOR VIOLATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY RULE. - Any violation of Sec. 34 of R.A. 10667 punished by a fine of not less than one million pesos (PI,000,000.00) but not more than five million pesos (P5,000,000.00).

LENIENCY PROGRAM; IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION; REDUCTION OF FINE. - Sec. 35 of R.A. 10667 provides that the Commission shall develop a “Leniency Program to be granted to any entity in the form of immunity from suit or reduction of any fine” which would otherwise be imposed on a participant in an anti-competitive agreement as provided in Section 14(a) and 14(b) of the Act “in exchange for the voluntary disclosure of information regarding such an agreement which satisfies specific criteria prior to or during the fact-finding or preliminary inquiry stage of the case.”

1.     IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. – Under Sec. 35 of R.A. 10667, immunity from suit will be granted to an entity reporting illegal anti-competitive activity before a fact-finding or preliminary inquiry has begun if the following conditions are met:

“X x x.

(a) At the time the entity comes forward, the Commission has not received information about the activity from any other source;

(b) Upon the entity’s discovery of illegal activity, it took prompt and effective action to terminate its participation therein;

(c) The entity reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full, continuing, and complete cooperation throughout the investigation; and

(d) The entity did not coerce another party to participate in the activity and clearly was not the leader in, or the originator of, the activity.

X x x.”

2.    LENIENCY. – Further, under Sec. 35 of R.A. 10667, even after the Commission has received information about the illegal activity after a fact-finding or preliminary inquiry has commenced, the reporting entity will be granted leniency, provided the conditions stated in Par. (b) and Par. (c) above and the following additional requirements are complied with:

“x x x.

(1) The entity is the first to come forward and qualify for leniency;

(2) At the time the entity comes forward, the Commission does not have evidence against the entity that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction; and

(3) The Commission determines that granting leniency would not be unfair to others.

X x x.”

4.    SCOPE OF LENIENCY PROGRAM.– Under Sec. 35 of R.A. 10667 such leniency program includes “the immunity from any suit or charge of affected parties and third parties, exemption, waiver, or gradation of fines and/or penalties giving precedence to the entity submitting such evidence”. An entity cooperating or furnishing information, document or data to the Commission in connection to an investigation being conducted “shall not be subjected to any form of reprisal or discrimination”.

5.     FALSE REPORTS. – Further, under Sec. 35 of R.A. 10667,  nothing in the said provision shall preclude prosecution for entities that report to the Commission “false, misleading, or malicious information, data or documents damaging to the business or integrity of the entities under inquiry as a violation of said section”. An entity found to have reported false, misleading or malicious information, data, or document is “penalized by a fine not less than the penalty imposed in the section reported to have been violated by the entity complained of.”

6.    POWER OF DOJ. - The DOJ may likewise grant “leniency or immunity” in the event that there is already a “preliminary investigation pending before it”.


NOLO CONTENDERE.– Sec, 36 of R.A. 10667 provides that an entity charged in a criminal proceeding pursuant to Section 14(a) and 14(b) of the Act “may enter a plea of Nolo Contendere, in which he does not accept nor deny responsibility for the charges but agrees to accept punishment as if he had pleaded guilty”.  The plea cannot be used against the defendant entity to prove liability “in a civil suit arising from the criminal action nor in another cause of action”. A plea of Nolo Contendere may be entered “only up to arraignment” and subsequently, “only with the permission of the court” which shall accept it only after weighing its effect on the parties, the public and the administration of justice.

NON-ADVERSARIAL REMEDIES.– Sec. 37 of R.A. 10667 provides that the Commission  shall encourage voluntary compliance with the Act and other competition laws by making available to the parties concerned the following and other analogous non-adversarial administrative remedies, before the institution of administrative, civil or criminal action:

“x x x.

(a) Binding Ruling. — Where no prior complaint or investigation has been initiated, any entity that is in doubt as to whether a contemplated act, course of conduct, agreement, or decision, is in compliance with, is exempt from, or is in violation of any of the provisions of this Act, other competition laws, or implementing rules and regulations thereof, may request the Commission, in writing, to render a binding ruling thereon: Provided, That the ruling is for a specified period, subject to extension as may be determined by the Commission, and based on substantial evidence.

In the event of an adverse binding ruling on an act, course or conduct, agreement, or decision, the applicant shall be provided with a reasonable period, which in no case shall be more than ninety (90) days, to abide by the ruling of the Commission and shall not be subject to administrative, civil, or criminal actionunless the applicant fails to comply with the provisions of this Act;

(b) Show Cause Order. — Upon preliminary findings motu proprio or on written complaint under oath by an interested party that any entity is conducting its business, in whole or in part in a manner that may not be in accord with the provisions of this Act or other competition laws, and it finds that the issuance of a show cause order would be in the interest of the public, the Commission shall issue and serve upon such entity or entities a written description of its business conduct complained of, a statement of the facts, data, and information together with a summary of the evidence thereof, with an order requiring the said entity or entities to show cause, within the period therein fixed, why no order shall issue requiring such person or persons to cease and desist from continuing with its identified business conduct, or pay the administrative fine therein specified, or readjust its business conduct or practices;

(c) Consent Order. – At any time prior to the conclusion by the Commission of its inquiry, any entity under inquiry may, without in any manner admitting a violation of this Act or any other competition laws, submit to the Commission a written proposal for the entry of a consent order, specifying therein the terms and conditions of the proposed consent order which shall include among others the following:

(1) The payment of an amount within the range of fines provided for under this Act;

(2) The required compliance report as well as an undertaking to submit regular compliance reports;

(3) Payment of damagesto any private party/parties who may have suffered injury; and
(4) Other terms and conditions that the Commission deems appropriate and necessary for the effective enforcement of this Act or other Competition Laws:

Provided, That a consent order shall not bar any inquiry for the same or similar acts if continued or repeated;

(d) Monitoring of Compliance. – The Commission shall monitor the compliance by the entity or entities concerned, their officers, and employees, with the final and executory binding ruling, cease and desist order, or approval of a consent judgment. Upon motion of an interested party/parties, the Commission shall issue a certification or resolution to the effect that the entity or entities concerned have, or have not, as the case may be, complied with a final and executory ruling, order, or approval.

(e) Inadmissibility of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings. – The request for a binding ruling, the show cause order, or the proposal for consent order; the facts, data, and information therein contained or subsequently supplied by the entity or entities concerned; admissions, oral or written, made by them against their interest; all other documents filed by them, including their evidence presented in the proceedings before the Commission; and the judgment or order rendered thereon; shall not be admissible as evidence in any criminal proceedings arising from the same act subject of the binding ruling, show cause order or consent order against such entity or entities, their officers, employees, and agents.

X x x.”


CONTEMPT. - Sec. 38 of R.A. 10667 grants to the Commission may summarily punish for contempt by imprisonment not exceeding thirty (30) days or by a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000.00), or both, any entity guilty of such misconduct in the presence of the Commissionin its vicinity as to seriously interrupt any hearing, session or any proceeding before it, including cases in which an entity willfully fails or refuses, without just cause, to comply with a summons, subpoena or subpoena duces tecum legally issuedby the Commission, or, being present at a hearing, proceeding, session or investigation, refused to be sworn as a witness or to answer questions or to furnish information when lawfully required to do so.

APPEALS. - Sec. 39 of R.A. 10667 provides that the decisions of the Commission shall be “appealable to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Rules of Court.” The appeal shall “not stay the order, ruling or decision sought to be reviewed, unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms and conditions it may deem just”. In the appeal, “the Commission shall be included as a party respondent to the case.”

WRIT OF EXECUTION. - Sec. 40 of R.A. No. 10667 provides that upon the finality of its binding ruling, order, resolution, decision, judgment, or rule or regulation, collectively, the Commission “may issue a writ of execution to enforce its decision and the payment of the administrative fines provided in the preceding sections.”

TRIPLE FINE. – Sec. 41 of R.A. 10667 provides that “if the violation involves the trade or movement of basic necessities and prime commodities as defined by Republic Act No. 7581, as amended, the fine imposed by the Commission or the courts, as the case may be, shall be tripled.”

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT OF THE COMMISSIONERS. – Sec. 42 of R.A. 10667 provides that the Chairperson, the Commissioners, officers, employees and agents of the Commission “shall not be subject to any action, claim or demand in connection with any act done or omitted by them in the performance of their duties and exercise of their powers except for those actions and omissions done in evident bad faith or gross negligence.”

INDEMNITY. Sec. 43 of R.A. 10667 provides that unless the actions of the Commission or its Chairperson, any of its Commissioners, officers, employees and agents are found to be in willful violation of this Act, performed with evident bad faith or gross negligence, the Commission, its Chairperson, Commissioners, officers, employees and agents “are held free and harmless to the fullest extent permitted by law from any liability, and they shall be indemnified for any and all liabilities, losses, claims, demands, damages, deficiencies, costs and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature that may arise in connection with the exercise of their powers and performance of their duties and functions.”

The Commission shall underwrite or advance litigation costs and expenses, including legal fees and other expenses of external counsel, or provide legal assistance to its Chairperson, Commissioners, officers, employees, or agents in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative or any other action or proceeding, to which they are made a party by reason of, or in connection with, the exercise of authority or performance of duties and functions under the Act.

However, such legal protection “shall not apply to any civil, criminal, administrative, or any action or proceeding that may be initiated by the Commission, against such Chairperson, Commissioners, officers, employees, or agents.

That the Chairperson, Commissioners, officers, employees, or agents, who shall resign, retire, transfer to another agency or be separated from the service, “shall continue to be provided with such legal protection in connection with any act done or omitted to be done by them in good faith during their tenure or employment with the Commission.”

In the event of a settlement or compromise, indemnification shall be provided “only in connection with such matters covered by the settlement as to which the Commission is advised by counsel that the persons to be indemnified did not commit any negligence or misconduct.”

The costs and expenses incurred in defending the aforementioned action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the Commission in advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding upon receipt of “an undertaking by or on behalf of the Chairperson, Commissioner, officer, employee, or agent to repay the amount advanced should it ultimately be determined by the Commission that one is not entitled to be indemnified as provided in this section.”

JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. - Sec. 44 of R.A. 10667 provides that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the city or province where the entity or any of the entities whose business act or conduct Constitutes the subject matter of a case, conducts its principal place of business, shall have “original and exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the penalties and fines herein imposed, of all criminal and civil cases involving violations of this Act and other competition-related laws.”

If the defendant or anyone is charged “in the capacity of a director, officer, shareholder, employee, or agent” of a corporation or other juridical entity who knowingly and willfully authorized the commission of the offense charged, the “Regional Trial Court of the city or province where such corporation or juridical entity conducts its principal place of business, shall have jurisdiction.”

CIVIL ACTION. - Sec. 45 of R.A. 10667 provides that any person who suffers direct injury by reason of any violation of the Act “may institute a separate and independent civil actionafter the Commission has completed the preliminary inquiry provided under Section 31”.

PRESCRIPTION (Statute of Limitations). - Sec. 46 of R.A. 10667 provides that any action arising from a violation of any provision of this Act shall be “forever barred unless commenced within five (5) years from:

“x x x.
  • For criminal actions, the time the violation is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents; and
  • For administrative and civil actions, the time the cause of action accrues.
X x x.”


TRIAL COURT MAY NOT ISSUE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST THE COMMISSION.- Sec. 47 of R.A. 10667 provides that, except for the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, no other court shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the Commission in the exercise of its duties or functions.

The prohibition does notapply when the matter is “of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that the non-issuance of a temporary restraining order will result in grave injustice and irreparable injury to the public”.
The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the Court, but in no case shall it exceed twenty percent (20%) of the imposable fines provided for under Chapter VI, Section 29 of the Act,

In the event that the court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the relief applied for, the bond shall accrue in favor of the Commission.
Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of this section is “void and of no force and effect”.

Any judge who violates this section may be “penalized by suspension of at least one (1) year without pay in addition to other criminal, civil or administrative penalties”.

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS. _Sec. 48 of R.A. 10667 provides that nothing contained in the Act shall be construed to prohibit the existence and operation of trade associations organized to promote quality standards and safety issues.
The associations should not in any way be used to justify any violation of the Act.

It is not illegal to use the association as a forum to discuss or promote quality standards, efficiency, safety, security, productivity, competitiveness and other matters of common interest involving the industry, provided, that such is done without any anti-competitive intent or effect.

TRANSITIONAL CLAUSE. - Sec. 53 of R.A. 10667 provides that in order to allow affected parties time to renegotiate agreements or restructure their business to comply with the provisions of this Act, an existing business structure, conduct, practice or any act that may be in violation of this Act shall be subject to the administrative, civil and criminal penalties prescribed herein only if it is not cured or is continuing upon the expiration of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act.

This section does not apply to administrative, civil and criminal proceedings against anti­competitive agreement or conduct, abuse of dominant position, and anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, initiated “prior to the entry into force of this Act”.

During the said two (2)-year period, the government shall undertake an advocacy program to inform the general public of the provisions of the Act.

LAWS REPEALED.

Sec. 55 of R.A. 10667 repealed, amended or otherwise accordingly modified the following laws, decrees, executive orders and regulations, or part or parts thereof inconsistent with any provision of the Act:

“x x x.

(a) Article 186 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That violations of Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code committed before the effectivity of this Act may continue to be prosecuted unless the same have been barred by prescription, and subject to the procedure under Section 31 of this Act;

(b) Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 138;

(c) Section 43(u) on Functions of the ERC of Republic Act No. 9136, entitled “An Act Ordaining Reforms in the Electric Power Industry, Amending for the Purpose Certain Laws and for Other Purposes”, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001”, insofar as the provision thereof is inconsistent with this Act;

(d) Section 24 on Illegal Acts of Price Manipulation and Section 25 on Penalty for Illegal Acts of Price Manipulation of Republic Act No. 9502, entitled “An Act Providing for Cheaper and Quality Medicines, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code, Republic Act No. 6675 or the Generics Act of 1988, and Republic Act No. 5921 or the Pharmacy Law, and for Other Purposes”, otherwise known as the “Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008” insofar as the provisions thereof are inconsistent with this Act; and

(e) Executive Order No. 45, Series of 2011, Designating the Department of Justice as the Competition Authority, Department of Justice Circular 005 Series of 2015, and other related issuances, insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

X x x.”


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Appeal; interlocutory order vs. final order, judgment; remedy when interlocutory order is adverse.

August 10, 2015, 9:01 pm
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MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN­ FACT, MARYCRIS V. BALDEVIA VS. JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS AND COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 185595, January 09, 2013.
(THE LAWYER'S POST).


“x x x.

This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and final orders, as follows:

x x x A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and executory.”

x x x x

Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory” e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.⁠1 
[Emphasis supplied]

The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.

The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente litewhich may be availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order.⁠2 

On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders⁠3  which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These include orders for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and administration of common property.

Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders pertains only to private respondent’s motion to reduce support which was granted, and to her own motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in arrears which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment under the May 19, 1998 Order and related orders were in the nature of final orders assailable by ordinary appeal considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court can apply only prospectively. Thus, from the moment the accrued amounts became due and demandable, the orders under which the amounts were made payable by private respondent have ceased to be provisional and have become final.

We disagree.

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.⁠4  An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action.⁠5  Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or non- compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests. It is also important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed orders.

Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action.⁠6 The subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente lite.⁠7  A few years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This fact underscores the provisional character of the order granting support pendente lite. Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable.

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, appeal from interlocutory orders is not allowed. Said provision reads:

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice;

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied.)

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner’s appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.


X x x.”
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Intervention by private prosecutor in criminal cases (public crimes) allowed; conditions.

August 11, 2015, 8:18 pm
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LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE 
vs. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, G.R. No. 181658, August 7, 2013.


“x x x.

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007 Decision2 and the January 31, 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510. The CA affirmed the Orders4 dated August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila denying (a) the Omnibus Motion5 for the exclusion of a private prosecutor in the two criminal cases for perjury pending before the MeTC, and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration6 of the said order denying the Omnibus Motion, respectively.

X x x.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST; AND
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IN TURN UPHELD THE RIGHT OF RESPONDENT, AN ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF CHI, TO INTERVENE IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR PERJURY AS PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY.36

Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest, does not offend any private party but is a crime which only offends the public interest in the fair and orderly administration of laws. He opines that perjury is a felony where no civil liability arises on the part of the offender because there are no damages to be compensated and that there is no private person injured by the crime.

Petitioner argues that the CA’s invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan,cited by Justice Regalado in his book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have a civil interest in the criminal case in order to intervene through a private prosecutor. Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner points out that said case involved the crime of grave threats where Lim Tek Goan himself was one of the offended parties. Thus, even if the crime of grave threats did not have any civil liability to be satisfied, petitioner claims that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of right, may still intervene because he was one of the offended parties.

Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to represent respondent in this case despite the fact that the latter was not the offended party and did not suffer any damage as she herself did not allege nor claim in her Complaint-Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit that she or CHI suffered any damage that may be satisfied through restitution,37 reparation for the damage caused38 and indemnification for consequential damages.39 Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent is not the proper offended party that may intervene in this case as she was not authorized by CHI. Thus, he prayed, among others, that Atty. Macam or any private prosecutor for that matter be excluded from the prosecution of the criminal cases, and that all proceedings undertaken wherein Atty. Macam intervened be set aside and that the same be taken anew by the public prosecutor alone.40

On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant. Thus, she submits that pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil liability exists in this case.41

The petition has no merit.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable."42 Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.43

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:

SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.—Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as "the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed." In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,44 this Court rejected petitioner’s theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.

In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that:

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI’s property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent’s personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondent’s timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,47 cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.48

In Chua v. Court of Appeals,49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent who is also the corporation’s Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholder’s Meeting) was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private respondent’s testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.

When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:

Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

Petitioner avers, however, that respondent’s testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioner’s alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.

When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.

In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510 are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

X x x.”


Relevant Footnotes

19 Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.

30 Rodriguez v. Gadiane, 527 Phil. 691 (2006).
31 94 Phil. 197 (1953).
32 Volume II, Seventh Revised Edition, p. 236.
37 Article 105, REVISED PENAL CODE.
38 Article 106, id.
39 Article 107, id.
42 Article 100, Revised Penal Code.
43 Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987).
44 334 Phil. 621, 631-632 (1997).
45 487 Phil. 384 (2004).
47 Manuel Pamaran, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Annotated, 2010 Edition, p. 150.
48 Id. at 200; id. at 149-150, 153.
49 485 Phil. 644 (2004).
50 Id. at 658-660.

Summary of Cited Cases and References:

1.      Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil. 197 (1953).;
2.    Regalado in his Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, Seventh Revised Edition, p. 236.
3.    Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr., 240 Phil. 326, 331 (1987).
4.    Garcia v. CA, 334 Phil. 621, 631-632 (1997).
5.     Ramiscal Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 487 Phil. 384 (2004).
6.    Manuel Pamaran, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Annotated, 2010 Edition, p. 150.
7.     Chua v. CA, 485 Phil. 644 (2004).

8.    Rodriguez v. Gadiane, 527 Phil. 691 (2006).
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Private complainant may file motion for reconsideration and file a petition for certiorari in a criminal case by himself, even without the conformity of the public prosecutor or the OSG; when allowed.

August 11, 2015, 8:51 pm
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GERARDO A. MOSQUERA vs. HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, City of Makati, Metro Manila, HON. FELICIDAD Y. NAVARRO-QUIAMBAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, City of Makati, Metro Manila, and MARK F. JALANDONI, G.R. No. 121180, July 5, 1996.

“x x x.

Petitioner's contention is that, because the direction and control of criminal prosecutions are vested in the public prosecutor, the motion for reconsideration of the order of October 13, 1994, which the private prosecutor filed without the conformity by the public prosecutor, was a nullity and did not prevent the order of dismissal from becoming final. Consequently, the MeTC gravely abused its discretion in afterward reinstating the information.

Undoubtedly private respondent, as complainant, has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution. The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. 6  x x x.  In Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 7 where, through the Chief Justice, we held:

Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party," except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy.

In People v. Guido, [57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the offense.The right of the offended party to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari from an [interlocutory] order rendered in a criminal case was likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes v. Gopengco [29 SCRA 688 (1969)] and People v. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)] which held that "offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object. . . .

Petitioner cites the following statement in Cabral v. Puno 8 in support of his contention that private respondent has no personality to file the motion in question:

While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal [from the order of dismissal of the information]. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal.

The case of Cabral, however, differs materially from this case. In Cabral, the offended party had lost his right to intervene because prior to the filing of the criminal case, he had instituted a civil action arising from the same act subject of the criminal case. On the other hand, in the case at bar, the right of private respondent to intervene in the criminal prosecution is well nigh beyond question as he had neither instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do so. 9

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that private respondent has the legal personality to file the motion for reconsideration in the trial court.

X x x.”


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The question in this case is not so much whether the MeTC has the authority to grant or not to grant the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information it does but whether in the exercise of that discretion or authority it acted justly and fairly. In this case, the MeTC did not have good reason stated in its order for the reinstatement of the information against petitioner, just as it did not have good reason for granting the withdrawal of the information.

August 11, 2015, 9:09 pm
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GERARDO A. MOSQUERA vs. HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, City of Makati, Metro Manila, HON. FELICIDAD Y. NAVARRO-QUIAMBAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, City of Makati, Metro Manila, and MARK F. JALANDONI, G.R. No. 121180, July 5, 1996.

“x x x.

Beyond the personality of the private respondent to seek a reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the MeTC, the central issue in this case is whether in ordering the reinstatement of the information, the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

The MeTC invoked its authority under Crespo v. Mogul 10 to approve the withdrawal of informations after they have been filed in court, thus:

[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instruction of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Petitioner argues that by its order of October 13, 1994, the MeTC already exercised its authority under the Mogul doctrine to grant or deny the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information and was thereafter precluded from changing its mind in absence of a motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor.

This argument is untenable. The court could have denied the public prosecutor's 'motion for the withdrawal of the information against petitioner, and there would have been no question of its power to do so. If it could do that, so could it reconsider what it had ordered. Every court has the power and indeed the duty to review and amend or reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to any error or defect therein. 11 In this case, the motion for reconsideration was timely filed by the private prosecutor who, as already discussed, has the legal personality to do so.

Indeed, the MeTC must have realized that it had surrendered its exclusive prerogative regarding the withdrawal of informations by accepting public prosecutor's say-so that the prosecution had no basis to prosecute petitioner. 12Its order of October 13, 1994 was based mainly on its notion that the motion of the Trial Fiscal should be accorded weight and significance as it was premised on the findings [of the Department of Justice] that the filing of the information in question has no legal basis."

This certainly was not the exercise of discretion. As we said in Martinez, "whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this [under the Mogul ruling] . . . What was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency." 13

Unfortunately, just as in allowing the withdrawal of the information by the public prosecutor, the MeTC did not make an independent evaluation of the evidence, neither did it do so in granting the private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. In its order dated December 29, 1994, the MeTC simply stated that it was reinstating the case against petitioner because [a]fter carefully weighing the arguments of the parties in support of their respective claims, the Court believes that the weight of the evidence and the jurisprudence on the matter which is now presented for resolution heavily leaned in favor of complainant's contention" and that after a case has already been" forwarded, raffled, and assigned to a particular branch, the Public Prosecutor loses control over the case." The order contains no evaluation of the parties' evidence for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause to proceed against petitioner. The statement that the "weight of evidence . . . lean[s] heavily in favor of complainant's [Jalandoni's] contention" is nothing but the statement of a conclusion.

Nor could the MeTC rest its judgment solely on its authority under the Mogul doctrine to have the last word on whether an in formation should be withdrawn. 
The question in this case is not so much whether the MeTC has the authority to grant or not to grant the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information it does but whether in the exercise of that discretion or authority it acted justly and fairly. In this case, the MeTC did not have good reason stated in its order for the reinstatement of the information against petitioner, just as it did not have good reason for granting the withdrawal of the information.

The matter should therefore be remanded to the MeTC so that it can make an independent evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and on that basis decide whether to grant or not to grant the withdrawal of the information against petitioner.

X x x.”

Footnotes

10 Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, 471 (1987).
11 See Balayon Jr. v. Ocampo, 218 SCRA 13 (1993) citing Luzon Brokerage Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 483 (1989).
12 Dee v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 254 (1994); Martinez v. Court of Appeals, supra.
13 237 SCRA at 585. Accord, Roberts v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996.


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Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over resolutions issued by RTCs in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.

August 11, 2015, 9:21 pm
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ANGELITO P. MAGNO, Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MICHAEL MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ MAE GREGORIO, GIAN CARLO CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON, DONATO ENABE and ALFIE FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 171542,  April 6, 2011


“x x x.
Through a petition for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks the reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 26, 2005[2] in People of the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56, et al. (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79809), and its Resolution dated February 6, 2006[3] denying respondents motion for reconsideration.[4] The assailed rulings denied the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and upheld the ruling[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, which precluded Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy from acting as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. DU-10123.[6]

X x x.

The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTCs decision not to allow Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:

Section 4.  Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

x x x x

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had theretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." [emphasis and underscoring supplied]


This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over resolutions issued by RTCs in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.


We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.[37] In that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion for not dismissing the information for Malversation thru Falsification of Public Document. The CA refused to take cognizance of the case, holding that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition. Recognizing the amendments made to PD No. 1606 by RA No. 7975,[38] we sustained the CAs position since Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has expanded the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to include petitions for mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[39]

In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Magno. While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the RTC is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly filed with the CA. Magno should have filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation.[40]

The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without authority, we overrule theSeptember 26, 2005 Amended Decision of the CA and the subsequent denial of Magnos motions for reconsideration.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
the CAs judgment, issued without
jurisdiction, is void.


There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is conferred by law,[41] and any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void[42] and cannot be given any effect.[43] This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final judgment.[44]

We reiterated and clarified the rule further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v. Ricardo L. Gatdula, et al.,[45] as follows:

Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties action or conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC, we declared that:

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.


We note that Magno had already raised in his supplemental motion for reconsideration before the CA[46] the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the CAs Decision became final. The CA did not even consider this submission, choosing instead to brush it aside for its alleged failure to raise new or substantial grounds for reconsideration.[47]Clearly, however, its lack of jurisdiction is a new and substantial argument that the CA should have passed upon.

The Office of the Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel to cure the jurisdictional defect of its petition before the CA


The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case 
since Magno raised the issue of jurisdiction before the CAs decision became final. Further, even if the issue had been raised only on appeal to this Court, the CAs lack of jurisdiction could still not be cured. In Machado,[48] citing People of the Philippines v. Rosalina Casiano,[49] we held:

In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. However if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction.


X x x.”

[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, rollo, pp. 21-37.
[2] Id. at 40-43.
[3] Id. at 44 -45.
[4] Id. at 115-121.
[5] Id. at 65-66.
[6] Id. at 69-73.
[7] Ibid,; filed as Criminal Case No. DU-10123.
[8] Id. at 24.
[9] Id. at 74-76.
[10] Section 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors.  The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
The Ombudsman and his investigators and prosecutors, whether regular members of his staff or designated by him as herein provided, shall have authority to administer oaths, to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify under oath before them and/or bring books, documents and other things under their control, and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through application before the Sandiganbayan or before any inferior or superior court having jurisdiction of the place where the witness or evidence is found.
[11] Rollo, pp. 77-80.
[12] Id. at 81-84.
[13] Id. at 85-94.
[14] Id. at 66.
[15] Id. at 67-68.
[16] Id. at 46-59.
[17] Id. at 52-56.
[18] Id. at 95-104.
[19] Id. at 100.
[20] Id. at 101.
[21] Id. at 102.
[22] Id. at 11.
[23] Id. at 115-121.
[24] Id. at 40-43.
[25] Id. at 43.
[26] Id. at 44-45.
[27] Id. at 21-37.
[28] Id. at 28.
[29] G.R. No. 134102, July 6, 2000, 335 SCRA 265.
[30] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[31] Id. at 32-35.
[32] Id. at 35.
[33] Id. at 238.
[34] Id. at 237- 238.
[35] Id. at 238.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Supra note 29.
[38] Section. 4 of RA No. 7975 has since been supplanted by RA No. 8249: AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (but has retained the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs).
[39] Abbot v. Mapayo, supra note 29 at 271.
[40] Rollo, p. 70.
[41] Machado v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 156287, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 546, 559, citing Spouses Vargas v. Spouses Caminas, G.R. Nos. 137839-40, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 305, 317; Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, G.R. No. 154295, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 320, 335; and Dy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 229 Phil. 234, 242 (1986).
[42] Id. at 560, citing National Housing Authority v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 142601, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 38, 43.
[43] Id. at 561.
[44] Id. at 559, citing Lozon v. NLRC, 310 Phil. 1, 12-13 (1995), citing La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 (1994).
[45] Id.
[46] Rollo, pp. 132-134; dated January 3, 2006.
[47] Id. at 45.
[48] Supra note 41.
[49] L-15309, February 16, 1961, 1 SCRA 478.


↧

Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). The Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action.

August 11, 2015, 9:34 pm
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MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GLADYS NOCOM, G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005

“x x x.

Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

The Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings.

However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action.

While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one.

In short, while two crimes arise from a single set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it.

X x x.


Sole Issue:
Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar
to Civil Action in Estafa Case



Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising from the criminal case pending before the MTC for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa now pending before the RTC. She hinges her theory on the following provisions of Rules 110 and 111 of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. -- Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

x x x x x x x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.


Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are (not) entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainants interest in the case disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor.[8] None of these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit.

True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two criminal liabilities -- one for estafa and another for violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the offended party, who has sustained only a single injury.[9] This is the import of Banal v. Tadeo,[10] which we quote in part as follows:

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).


Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the institution of a civil action without need of election by the offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously available to this party, there can be no forum shopping.[11]

Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner ultimately espouses. At the present stage, no judgment on the civil liability has been rendered in either criminal case. There is as yet no call for the offended party to elect remedies and, after choosing one of them, be considered barred from others available to her.

Election of Remedies

Petitioner is actually raising the doctrine of election of remedies. In its broad sense, election of remedies refers to the choice by a party to an action of one of two or more coexisting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the same facts, but the term has been generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other.[12] In its more restricted and technical sense, the election of remedies is the adoption of one of two or more coexisting ones, with the effect of precluding a resort to the others.[13]

The Court further elucidates in Mellon Bank v. Magsino[14] as follows:

As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong.[15] It is regarded as an application of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot, in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions which form the basis of his respective remedies. However, when a certain state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative remedies, both founded upon the identical state of facts, these remedies are not considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the invocation of one remedy is not an election which will bar the other, unless the suit upon the remedy first invoked shall reach the stage of final adjudication or unless by the invocation of the remedy first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an advantage thereby or caused detriment or change of situation to the other.[16] It must be pointed out that ordinarily, election of remedies is not made until the judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits.[17]

Consonant with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, opined that while some American authorities hold that the mere initiation of proceedings constitutes a binding choice of remedies that precludes pursuit of alternative courses, the better rule is that no binding election occurs before a decision on the merits is had or a detriment to the other party supervenes.[18] This is because the principle of election of remedies is discordant with the modern procedural concepts embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure which permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies in his claim for relief without being required to elect between them at the pleading stage of the litigation.[19]



In the present cases before us, the institution of the civil actions with the estafa cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law[20] precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.

The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado (ret.), former chairman of the committee tasked with the revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He clarified that the special rule on BP 22 cases was added, because the dockets of the courts were clogged with such litigations; creditors were using the courts as collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary inclusion of a civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the face value of the check involved was laid down to prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge.[21]

Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule to preclude the prosecution of the civil action that corresponds to the estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and distinct from each other. There is no identity of offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked in the other. The offenses charged in the informations are perfectly distinct from each other in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in point of fact.[22]

What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation to file the corresponding civil action. The criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. [U]nless a separate civil action has been filed before the institution of the criminal action, no such civil action can be instituted after the criminal action has been filed as the same has been included therein.[23] In the instant case, the criminal action for estafa was admittedly filed prior to the criminal case for violation of BP 22, with the corresponding filing fees for the inclusion of the corresponding civil action paid accordingly.[24]

Furthermore, the fact that the Rules do not allow the reservation of civil actions in BP 22 cases cannot deprive private complainant of the right to protect her interests in the criminal action for estafa. Nothing in the current law or rules on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the corresponding civil case exclusively in the court trying the BP 22 criminal case.[25]

In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to leave the offended parties without any remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases. Its power to promulgate the Rules of Court is limited in the sense that rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.[26] Private complainants intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified not only for the prosecution of her interests, but also for the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the Constitution.[27]

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the private prosecutor may intervene before the RTC in the proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the corresponding civil action in the proceedings for violation of BP 22 pending before the MTC. A recovery by the offended party under one remedy, however, necessarily bars that under the other. Obviously stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment,[28] this is in essence the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission.

X x x.”

[1] Rollo, pp. 3-22.
[2] Id., p. 23. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
[3] Id.. p. 24-27.
[4] June 27, 2002 Order; rollo, p. 23
[5] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 153-155.
[6] The case was deemed submitted for decision on May 28, 2004, upon receipt by this Court of Petitioners Memorandum signed by Atty. Redemberto R. Villanueva. Respondents Manifestation and Motion For Leave to Adopt Comment as Memorandum, signed by Assistant Solicitor General Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Associate Solicitor Josephine de Sagon Mejia, was received by the Court on August 20, 2003.
[7] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 155.
[8] Gorospe v. Gamaitan, 98 Phil. 600, 602, March 14, 1956.
[9] See Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540, February 23, 1989.
[10] 156 SCRA 325, 329-330, December 11, 1987, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
[11] See Cancio v. Isip, 391 SCRA 393, November 12, 2002.
[12] Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, 190 SCRA 629, 649, October 18, 1990, per Fernan, CJ.
[13] Id., citing People v. Court of Appeals, No. 54641, November 28, 1980, 101 SCRA 450, 463- 464 citing Whitney v. Vermon [Tex. Civ. A] 154, 264, 267 and Southern R. Co. v. Attalla, 147 Ala. 653, 41 S. 664.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 603 P. 2d 793.
[16] Giron v. Housing Authority of Opelousas, 393 So. 2d 1267.
[17] Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Tracy, 557 P. 2d 639, 276 Or. 1193; Johnson v. Daves Auto Center, 257 Or. 34, 476 P. 2d 190.
[18] Radiowealth, Inc. v Lavin, L-18563, April 27, 1963, 7 SCRA 804.
[19] Giron v. Housing Authority of the City of Opelousas, supra.
[20] Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
[21] Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 9th revised ed., pp. 293-294.
[22] Ada v. Virola, 172 SCRA 336, 341, April 17, 1989.
[23] Agpalo, Handbook on Criminal Procedure (2001), pp. 96-97. Emphasis supplied.
[24] Section 20, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Other Fees. - The following fees shall also be collected by the clerks of Regional Trial Courts or courts of the first level, as the case may be:
(a)        In estafa cases where the offended party fails to manifest within fifteen (15) days following the filing of the information that the civil liability arising from the crime has been or would be separately prosecuted[.]
[25] Unlike in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special Court to Be Known as Sandiganbayan and For Other Purposes, December 10, 1978), as amended, which provides:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate action shall be deemed abandoned.
[26] See Abellana v. Marave, 156 Phil. 79, May 29, 1974. Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
[27] See Banal v. Tadeo Jr.; supra, p. 331.
[28] Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 541, 545, February 23, 1989.


↧

BP Blg. 22 cases; private complainant/offended party may intervene in the criminal case thru a private prosecutor.

August 11, 2015, 9:51 pm
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CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner, vs. THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City, Branch 105 and Rosario Claudio, respondents, [G.R. No. 78911-25. December 11, 1987.]


“x  x x.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.

The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order. As such, it is argued that it is the State and the public that are the principal complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may intervene.

On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.

A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in the case at bar.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable"(Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

"Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same."

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime(Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).

Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced. 

In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the wrong done to the private party defrauded when we stated therein that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an injury to the public."

Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. 


X x x.”
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